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Abstract
Cloaking-based location privacy preserving mechanisms have been widely adopted to protect users’ location privacy when
using location-based services. A fundamental limitation of such mechanisms is that users and their location information
in the system are inherently trusted by the Anonymization Server without any verification. In this paper, we show that
such an issue could lead to a new class of attacks called location injection attacks which can successfully violate users’
in-distinguishability (guaranteed by k-Anonymity) among a set of users. We propose and characterize location injection
attacks by presenting a set of attack models and quantify the costs associated with them. We then propose and evaluate
k-Trustee, a trust-aware location cloaking mechanism that is resilient to location injection attacks and guarantees a lower
bound on the user’s in-distinguishability. k-Trustee guarantees that each user in a given cloaked region can achieve the
required privacy level of k-Anonymity by including at least k-1 other trusted users in the cloaked region. We demonstrate
the effectiveness of k-Trustee through extensive experiments in a real-world geographic map and our experimental results
show that the proposed cloaking algorithm guaranteeing k-Trustee is effective against various location injection attacks.
Keywords: Location privacy attack; Location privacy protection; Trust; k-Anonymity; k-Trustee.
1. Introduction
The rapid development of the high-speed mobile net-
works and the growing usage of the advanced mobile de-
vices have made various location-based services to be indis-
pensable in people’s lives. Users’ location privacy threats
refer to the risks that an attacker can obtain unauthorized
access to raw location data by locating a transmitting de-
vice and identifying the subject (person) using it. Exam-
ples of such risks include spamming users with unwanted
advertisements, drawing sensitive inferences from victims’
visits to various locations (e.g., clinics and doctors’ of-
fices) and learning sensitive information about them (e.g.,
diseases, religious and political affiliations, etc.). Hence,
preserving location privacy is becoming a critical issue.
Various cloaking-based location privacy preserving mech-
anisms (CLPMs) have been proposed for protecting users’
location privacy from location based service providers [4,
34, 20]. As shown in Figure 1, CLPMs are usually imple-
mented through a trusted third party called Anonymiza-
tion Server (AS) that collects users’ location information
and performs an anonymization prior to releasing the sen-
sitive location information to location service providers
(LBSPs), which are assumed to be either curious-but-honest
or malicious. In some cases, the location service providers
(LBSPs) are also vulnerable to insider threats. When a
user u with a mobile device requests a location-based ser-
vice (e.g. searching for the nearest coffee shop) from an
LBSP, the mobile user first sends the request including
his exact location (e.g., longitude and latitude values) to
AS. AS then runs a location cloaking algorithm to reduce
the precision of u’s location to satisfy the required pri-
vacy level (e.g., k-Anonymity). After that, AS sends the
cloaked region associated with u to the LBSP which finally
generates the answer to u’s request based on the informa-
tion from AS. This answer is sent back to u either directly,
or through AS as an intermediate tier which delivers the
answer to u later.
Figure 1: Architecture of a cloaking-based location privacy preserv-
ing mechanism.
One way to protect the location privacy of u is to en-
hance the in-distinguishability of u among a group of users,
which is defined as k-Anonymity [4, 20]. Specifically, k-
Anonymity guarantees that the location of a given user is
indistinguishable from those of at least k − 1 other users.
In addition to k-Anonymity, several extended CLPMs have
been proposed, such as POI (points of interest) l-Diversity
[4], which ensures the in-distinguishability of a user’s lo-
cation from a set of POIs, and road segment s-Diversity
[40], which guarantees the in-distinguishability of a user’s
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location from a set of road segments. However, one fun-
damental limitation of these CLPMs is that all users and
their location information have to be trusted by AS, which
makes the CLPMs vulnerable in practice. Specifically, by
exploiting this implicit assumption, an attacker can create
fake users with carefully manipulated location information
to forcibly reduce the privacy level guaranteed by CLPMs
and significantly increase the chance of identifying a tar-
geted user’s location. Due to the limitation mentioned
above, AS is unaware of the privacy level reduction caused
by the injected fake users and therefore no precautionary
measure or remedial measure can be implemented. In this
paper, we first show that such vulnerability can lead to
a new class of attacks called location injection attacks,
which can successfully compromise privacy of the users’
location and trajectory information. After characterizing
the location injection attacks, we present various attack
models and discuss the cost associated with them. Then,
to mitigate the location injection attacks, we further pro-
pose a trust based mechanism called k-Trustee, which in-
novatively combines trust management with k-anonymity
to distinguish fake users (untrusted users) from real users
(trusted users) to make it resilient to the location injec-
tion attacks. The resilience of the proposed k-Trustee is
theoretically analyzed and experimentally evaluated. In
summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We first propose and characterize location injection
attacks that can compromise users’ privacy setting of
k-Anonymity in an existing CLPM. We experimen-
tally demonstrate the effectiveness of such attacks
through simulations.
• Second, we propose the notion of trust in CLPMs
and design a suite of trust-based location cloaking
algorithms that can mitigate the impact of location
injection attacks.
• Finally, we present the theoretical and experimental
analyses of the proposed approaches to demonstrate
and validate their effectiveness and resilience against
location injection attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we review the basic concepts of CLPMs. We then de-
fine the notion of location injection attacks in CLPMs and
introduce the attack models. In Section 3, we define the
concept of trust between users and introduce the notion
of k-Trustee and design a cloaking algorithm that guaran-
tees the k-Trustee property. In Section 4, we demonstrate
the effectiveness of location injection attacks and experi-
mentally evaluate the resilience of our proposed cloaking
algorithms against location injection attacks. Finally, we
summarize the related work in Section 5 and conclude the
paper in Section 6.
Figure 2: A road network example with 24 junctions and 37 road
segments
2. Location Injection Attacks
In this section, we first model the road network and
present the location cloaking techniques based on it. We
then propose the location injection attacks and attack mod-
els.
2.1. Road Network Model
In various cloaking approaches, users are assumed to
travel in a road network [40] which is modeled as a graph
G(J, S), where J represents the set of road junctions and
S represents the set of road segments. A junction is de-
fined as the crossover point of any two roads or the end of a
road segment. A road segment is defined as the direct road
connecting any two adjacent junctions, which may include
several point-of-interest (POI) venues. Each segment is
uniquely determined by the two junctions associated with
it while each junction is associated with one or more adja-
cent road segments. A road segment si that connects two
road junctions jp, jq can be denoted by si = (jp, jq). An
example road network is shown in Figure 2 where there
are 24 road junctions and 37 road segments.
In particular, for each road segment si = (jp, jq) in the
road network, we define the set of segments sharing either
junction jp or junction jq with si to be the neighbor set of
si, which is denoted by NS
si . For example, in Figure 2,
NSs1 = {s2, s4, s5}. Similarly, given a region R including
several road segments, NSR indicates the neighbor set of
R, which consists of segments sharing at least one junction
with the segments in R. In Figure 2, assuming that R =
{s1, s2}, we have NSR = {s3, s4, s5, s6}.
2.2. Location Cloaking Models
In a road network, the objective of cloaking-based loca-
tion privacy protection mechanisms (CLPM) is to preserve
users’ location privacy during their travels in the road net-
work. The fundamental privacy notion behind conven-
tional location cloaking models is location k-Anonymity
[20, 17, 19], which guarantees the in-distinguishability of a
user among a set of users. In other words, a user’s location
2
information exposed after the location cloaking process is
indistinguishable from that of at least k − 1 other users.
Several extensions have also been proposed to enhance
the privacy protection offered by cloaking based solutions,
such as POI l-Diversity [4] which additionally ensures the
in-distinguishability of a user’s location from a set of POIs
and road segment s-Diversity [40] which additionally guar-
antees the in-distinguishability of a user’s location from a
set of road segments. In this paper, we focus on the lo-
cation cloaking models guaranteeing k-Anonymity and/or
s-Diversity. We present the basic definitions below.
Definition 1. k-Anonymity [20, 17, 19]. A user u’s loca-
tion is said to satisfy the k-Anonymity at time t, if there
are at least k − 1 other users present at the same cloaked
region at t.
Definition 2. s-Diversity [40]. A user u’s location satis-
fies s-Diversity at time t, if there are at least k − 1 other
users at the same cloaked region at t and there are at least
s road segments in the cloaked region.
Note that in this paper we set the atomic element of a
cloaked region as a road segment in a road network [40];
i.e., a cloaked region consists of only road segments. For
example, in Figure 2, we assume that there are 6 users,
u1, u2, u3, u4, u5 and u6, in the road network. We also
assume that both the k-Anonymity and the s-Diversity
requirements are 4 (k = s = 4) for u1 and 3 (k = s =
3) for other users. In a CLPM that only guarantees the
k-Anonymity, the cloaked region for u1 can be the area
consisting of s12, s15 and s16. When the s-Diversity is
supported by a CLPM, the cloaked region for u1 can be
the area composed of s12, s15, s16 and s17 as it ensures at
least 4 segments in the cloaked region.
In the next section, we define the location injection
attacks aiming to compromise the location privacy of mo-
bile users, which work by manipulating locations of fake
and/or compromised users1. We consider a user’s loca-
tion privacy is compromised when an attacker can either
identify the road segment where the user is (e.g. find s16
from s12, s15, s16 for u1 in Figure 2) or shrink the cloaked
region to a smaller size (e.g. shrink s12, s15, s16 to s12,
s16 for u1 in Figure 2), which breaches the user’s privacy
requirements (k-Anonymity and/or s-Diversity). We also
refer to the violation of a user’s trajectory privacy as the
case where an attacker can identify a series of consecutive
road segments a user visits.
2.3. Attack Definition
To define the location injection attack, we assume,
without loss of generality, that there is a road network
1In this paper, a compromised user refers to an authentic user
whose location information can be arbitrarily manipulated by an
attacker. In the rest of this paper, we simply use the notion of fake
users to indicate the set of fake as well as compromised users utilized
in location injection attacks.
G(J, S), an attacker, a trusted user u who travels in G and
requests a location-based service from an LBSP through
an Anonymization Server (AS). The user u has a privacy
setting ku for k-Anonymity and AS guarantees the pri-
vacy requirement in the generated cloaked region using a
cloaking-based location privacy preserving algorithm (e.g.,
PrivacyGrid [4], Casper [34], XStar [40]). We also assume
that the attacker is the LBSP or a part of the LBSP that
tries to compromise u’s privacy requirement of ku, indicat-
ing a form of insider attack. The attacker (LBSP) knows
the initial cloaked region including u before launching the
attacks from u’s recent location requests sent to the LBSP.
Let a fake user be a user that does not physically exist but
the attacker has created an account for him in the system,
or an authentic user whose location can be manipulated
by the attacker.
Adversary’s Action : Let ui be a targeted user. An
adversary’s attack involves intelligently manipulating a num-
ber of fake users’ locations using various schemes to iden-
tify ui’s location. Let R
ui be the cloaked region created
in response to a request from ui. Let U(R
ui) be the set
containing all the users including ui in R
ui and Uf (R
ui)
be the set of fake users in Rui .
Location Injection Attack : We say that ui is a
victim of a location injection attack, when |U(Rui)| −
|Uf (Rui)| < kui . Here |U | indicates the number of users
in a user set U .
In a location injection attack, an attacker can distin-
guish the fake users since these users are either created
or controlled by the attacker. As a result, the number of
remaining users in the cloaked region, namely |U(Rui)| −
|Uf (Rui)|, becomes less than the user’s privacy require-
ment of kui . When this happens, a user’s privacy require-
ment is compromised. In addition, the size of the cloaked
region constructed for ui or the number of POIs in the
cloaked region may also be controlled (e.g., decrease its
size) by placing fake users in strategic locations. For ex-
ample, as shown in Figure 3, there are six trusted users
u1, u2, u3, u4, u5 and u6 traveling in a road network.
An attacker can utilize six fake users fu1, fu2, fu3, fu4,
fu5 and fu6 and report their locations in the road seg-
ments around the road junction, Jun1. We assume that
u1 has the k-Anonymity requirement of k
u1 = 6 and let
the k-Anonymity requirements of other users be less than
or equal to 6. Without the presence of fake users, AS may
generate a cloaked region containing users u1, u2, u3, u4,
u5 and u6. The probability of inferring u1 from that of
others in the cloaked region is 1/6. However, when the
attacker launches a location injection attack, AS may gen-
erate a cloaked region including segments Seg1 and Seg3
where there are only two authentic users {u1, u2} and four
fake users {fu2, fu4, fu5, fu6}. Since the attacker can
distinguish fake users in the constructed cloaked region,
the probability of identifying u1 from others is now reduced
to 1/2, which compromises u1’s privacy requirement of k-
Anonymity. Hence, the attacker now has a higher proba-
bility of identifying u1’s exact location; i.e., u1 could be
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traveling in Seg1, Seg2, Seg3, Seg4 or Seg11 without the
attack but when the location injection attack is launched,
u1 would be associated with either Seg1 or Seg3.
Figure 3: An instance of a location injection attack
Note that a location injection attack is successful only
when the number of trusted users is less than that required
to support a user’s k-Anonymity requirements. For exam-
ple, in Figure 3, if ku1 = 2, then u1’s privacy requirement
is not violated even under the location injection attack.
Detailed analysis of this attack model is provided in Sec-
tion 3.4. In addition, a location injection attack can be
targeted at multiple users simultaneously. It can be also
used to infer a targeted user’s trajectory when a sequence
of location injection attacks for the targeted user are suc-
cessful.
In our previous work [25], we simply defined the lo-
cation injection attack where attackers can arbitrarily set
their locations and thus their trajectories appear suspi-
cious. In addition, we assume that fake users have the
lowest k-Anonymity requirement supported by AS. This
is because an attacker does not expect to trigger the ex-
pansion of a cloaked region and aims to induce the CLPM
to construct a cloaked region as small as possible. In the
next section, we model the location injection attacks.
2.4. Attack Models
We present the following three different location pri-
vacy attacks: stalking attack, fixed-location attack and fixed-
trajectory attack. Generally speaking, location privacy at-
tacks involve inferring a relationship between a user and
his private location information based on the locations he
has visited. Depending on the motive, an adversary may
want to find out either ‘the locations that have been visited
by a targeted user ’ or ’the users who have visited a cho-
sen location of interest ’. In the first case, an adversary
is more interested in learning private information about
the user, so he can launch the stalking attack to contin-
uously stalk the locations of that user and infer private
information from collected locations. In the second case,
an adversary may target a specific kind of private infor-
mation (e.g., health information, political inclination) and
be more interested in learning about the users associated
with this private information. Here, the adversary can
launch the fixed-location attack to continuously monitor
the users visiting a specific location (e.g., a hospital) or
the fixed-trajectory attack using a specific trajectory (e.g.,
a parade route) to monitor the users following that trajec-
tory. These will help infer the relationship between the
users and some private information. The main difference
between the fixed-location attack and the fixed-trajectory
attack is that in the first case private/sensitive informa-
tion is implied by a visit to a specific location while in
the second case private information is implied by a user’s
movement along a specific trajectory.
2.4.1. Stalking Attack
When a location injection attack targets a specific user
u, its main purpose is to compromise u’s privacy require-
ment for k-Anonymity and identify/infer more accurately
his location at a specific time; e.g., the road segment where
u is located at time t. When the attacker has obtained a
series of more accurate locations of u, he can infer or even
identify the detailed trajectory of u. We call such an at-
tack scenario stalking attack and we define it as follows.
Assumption : We assume that the attacker is the
LBSP or a part of the LBSP that tries to compromise
u’s privacy requirement of ku, indicating a form of insider
attack. Like many previous work [17, 29, 34], we assume
that each LBS query contains a user ID (or pseudonym),
so the attacker (LBSP) has the ability to track u’s cloaked
regions. In addition, we assume that u sends LBS queries
with a high frequency, so that the attacker (LBSP) can fre-
quently receive u’s cloaked regions and use them to stalk
u. Finally, we assume the attacker (LBSP) can generate
an arbitrary number of fake users to be located at any
segment.
Identifying Initial Road Segment of the Target :
To explain the identification of initial position of a user, we
assume a user u keeps sending LBS queries (with cloaked
regions) to the attacker (LBSP) at t = −1, 0, 1, 2... At
t = −1, the attacker (LBSP) received u’s cloaked region
Ru−1, which contains no fake users. Then, between t = −1
and t = 0, the attacker (LBSP) decides to stalk u. For
each road segment in Ru−1 and its neighbor set NS
Ru−1 , the
attacker places a number of fake users (e.g., the number of
fake users deployed to each segment could be equal to the
maximum value of k that AS allows a user to declare, so
k ≥ ku). All these fake users should periodically query the
attacker (LBSP) through the anonymization server to be
involved in u’s future cloaked regions. Later, when t = 0, u
sends the next LBS query to the attacker (LBSP) through
the anonymization server, which will generate the next
cloaked region containing u, denoted by Ru0 . We define the
segment containing u in Ru0 as u’s initial segment, denoted
by suinit. Since segment s
u
init contains k fake users and
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k ≥ ku, Ru0 will be {suinit}, so suinit can be identified.
Stalking Attack : After suinit has been identified, the
attacker starts to stalk u. Specifically, the attacker makes
the fake users move only within NSs
u
init . Later, when u
moves to a new segment from suinit and queries AS at t = i
(i > 0) to generate the cloaked regionRui , which is different
from Ru0 , the attacker makes the fake users move into R
u
i
as soon as possible to identity u’s new position sui inside
Rui . Similarly, when u moves to another segment from s
u
i
and queries AS at t = j (j > i) to generate the cloaked
region Ruj , the attacker tries to manipulate the trajectories
of the fake users to identity u’s new position suj inside R
u
j .
By repeating these steps, the attacker can keep stalking u.
Example : We show a comprehensive example of loca-
tion injection attack in Figure 4, a part of the road network
in Figure 2 . We assume the target user u1 moves along
the trajectory s16 → s12 → s9. We assume u1 sends three
queries to AS at t = −1, 0, 1 when it moves along s16,
three queries to AS at t = 2, 3, 4 when it moves along s12
and finally three queries to AS at t = 5, 6, 7 when it moves
along s9. We also assume the cloaked region at t = −1
is Ru1−1 = {s16, s21}. At time t = −1, Ru1−1 = {s16, s21}
is known by the attacker, so the attacker can place 5 fake




at t = 0, since Ru10 = {s16}, the initial segment is iden-
tified. Please notice that we only show the 5 fake users
(fu1, fu2, fu3, fu4 and fu5) assigned to segment s16 and
omit other fake users. After that, to stalk the user u1, the
attacker can dynamically create trajectories for the de-
ployed fake users to make them always run after u1. That
is, given that the cloaked regions of u1 at time t = 2 and
t = 5 are Ru12 = {s8, s11, s12, s15} and Ru15 = {s9, s13},
respectively, the attacker can control the deployed fakes
users to enter the two regions to shrink them to {s12} and
{s9}, respectively, so that the trajectory s16 → s12 → s9
can be disclosed.
2.4.2. Fixed-location Attack
As another class of location injection attacks, an at-
tacker may cast anchor at a specific location and aim to
identify users who visit the targeted location, thus com-
promising the location privacy of the visitors. That is,
instead of stalking a user to incrementally collect his sen-
sitive locations, the attacker can select a fixed sensitive
place (e.g., a hospital) and wait for the victims to fall into
a snare. An attacker can manipulate the locations of the
fake users to the targeted sensitive locations that are close
to the targeted location. When users visit the targeted
location, users’ privacy requirements for the k-Anonymity
are compromised with a higher probability. This is be-
cause the cloaked region has fake users who are controlled
by the attacker. The probability of identifying a user is de-
termined by the ratio of real users to fake users. To obtain
a probability close to 100%, the adversary should estimate
the number of real users and adjust the number of fake
users based on that. We call such an attack fixed-location
attack and it works as follows.
Figure 4: An example of the stalking attack. In the example, an
adversity keeps using fakes users (fu1, fu2, fu3, fu4 and fu5) to
stalk the target user u1 and successfully shrinks the cloaked regions
R1 and R2 to smaller regions R′1 and R
′
2. Please notice that we
only show the 5 fake users (fu1, fu2, fu3, fu4 and fu5) assigned to
segment s16 and omit other fake users assigned to other segments.
Assumptions: The assumptions are same as the ones
presented in Section 2.4.1.
Fixed-location Attack : The attacker places m fake
users at the targeted road segment s and makes these fake
users stay at s (e.g., visiting POIs at s) during the attack.
Example : In Figure 4, an attacker targets the road
segment s16 and tries to identify users who are traveling
in s16 by injecting fu1, fu2, fu3, fu4 and fu5. We assume
that a user u1 is traveling in s16 and she has a privacy set-
ting ku1 = 4. When u1 requests a location-based service,
AS selects s16 as a cloaked region such that it satisfies
u1’s privacy requirement k
u1 . Since there is only u1 in
the cloaked region besides fake users, the attacker can de-
termine u1 is at s16. Without launching such an attack,
the cloaked region constructed for u1 may consist of s12,
s15 and s16 which includes other three users who are not
created by the attacker. In this case, the attacker cannot
identify exactly where u1 is located. It could be s12, s15
or s16.
2.4.3. Fixed-trajectory Attack
In certain situations, an attacker may be interested to
identify users who travel at a specific trajectory consisting
of a set of connected road segments. We call such an attack
fixed-trajectory attack and it works as follows. (e.g., s16 →
s12 → s9 in Figure 4).
Assumptions. The assumptions are same as the ones
presented in Section 2.4.1.
Fixed-trajectory Attack . The attacker can first iden-






NSs neighbor set of s.
Rut cloaked region of u at t.
t; τ time point; time duration.
dut (ui, uj) coarse distance between ui and uj at t.
dst (ui, sj) coarse distance between ui and sj at t.∑
t∈τ
cutut (ui, uj) coarse-grained user-user trust during τ .∑
t∈τ
cltst (ui, sj) coarse-grained user-location trust during τ .∑
t∈τ
futut (ui, uj) fine-grained user-user trust during τ .∑
t∈τ
fltst (ui, sj) fine-grained user-location trust during τ .
eu e-stalker parameter of u.
fu f-stationary parameter u.
(eul ,f
u
l ) local trust parameters of u.
(eug ,f
u
g ) global trust parameters of u.
Uult(t) local trustees of u.
Uugt(t) global trustees of u.
UuT (t) trustees of u.
UuT (R
u
t ) trustees of u in cloaked region R
u
t .
ku k-Anonymity parameter of u.
RuM maximum acceptable cloaked region size of
u.
TuM maximum acceptable response time of u.
pu privacy parameters of u.
Uult−e(t) potential e-stalkers of u.
Table 1: Summary of notations
segment in the targeted trajectory in the road network.
Then, the attacker can simulate the trajectories of fake
users continuously traveling in this circle. Note that the
attacker has to create an adequate number of fake users
at each road segment in the circle continuously in order
to best induce AS to construct the cloaked regions that
include only one road segment.
Example : In Figure 4, to identify the users travelling
along the trajectory s16 → s12 → s9, the attacker can sim-
ulate the trajectories of fake users continuously traveling
in this circle s16 → s12 → s9 → s13 → s18 → s16.
In summary, we can see that the stalking attack and
the fixed-location attack mainly compromise users’ loca-
tion privacy while the fixed-trajectory attack can compro-
mise users’ trajectory privacy. In Section 4, we experimen-
tally simulate these three attacks and demonstrate their
effectiveness in successfully invading the location privacy
of users. Next, we present the ways to mitigate these lo-
cation injection attacks.
3. Mitigating Location Injection Attacks
In this section, we first discuss potential solutions to
defend against location injection attacks. We then intro-
duce various definitions related to trust computations and
propose the trust based cloaking-based mechanism against
location injection attacks, k-Trustee. Notations that will
be used in this section are summarized in Table 1.
3.1. Discussions of Potential Solutions
An intuitive approach to defend against location injec-
tion attacks is to design a detection mechanism for AS to
detect fake users. When users are identified as fake by
the detection process, their location-based requests can be
rejected by AS. Such a detection approach can be based
on the characteristics of a user (e.g., IP address) or the
user’s trajectory (e.g., suspicious or abnormal trajecto-
ries). However, it has the following issues:
• It needs a verification process to validate the iden-
tified fake users, which incurs additional cost. It
is also difficult to design such a process because of
users’ privacy preferences.
• There will always be false-positives and false-negatives
in a detection approach. Trusted users will not be
able to request any location-based service when they
are identified as false-positives. For example, a trusted
user may have a suspicious trajectory around a sta-
dium while trying to find a parking slot (similar to
the trajectories of fake users in the fixed-trajectory
attack). A detection approach may mistakenly flag
the trusted user as a fake user because of her sus-
picious trajectory. In addition, when the fake users
are flagged as false-negatives, they can still be used
in location injection attacks.
• It is also very difficult to completely characterize fake
users and their suspicious trajectories.
We also note that the encryption-based approaches [11]
to encrypt users’ information and disconnect their identi-
ties with their locations are also feasible approaches to
defend against the location injection attack. However, the
cost of the encryption and decryption for each request of
the location-based service from each user may be high,
which makes such an approach less practical.
In this paper, we propose a trust based mitigation ap-
proach, named k-Trustee, that aims to reduce the impact
of the location injection attacks through trust computa-
tions. Such a trust based mitigation approach has the
following advantages:
• It does not detect nor validate fake users but it will
mitigate the impact of suspicious users who could be
either trusted users or fake users. Compared with de-
tection approaches where false-positives and/or false-
negatives are usually inevitable, the proposed miti-
gation approach will never forbid real users to re-
quest services.
• Users including fake users are always able to request
services from AS and LBSPs. However, anonymity
service is not free lunch. Users including attackers
have to pay for that service. In this case, the attacker
has to pay for a cost to conduct location injection
attacks irrespective of whether the attacks are suc-
cessful or not. Such a mechanism can significantly
increase the attack cost for the attacker.
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3.2. Trust Computations
In this subsection, we first introduce the computations
of the user-user trust and the user-location trust and then
apply these trust computations to define k-Trustee.
3.2.1. Trust Functions
The principle behind the computation of trust is that
a user uj is more trusted by another user ui or a road
segment si if uj is always further away from ui or si. When
uj follows ui (uj is always close to ui) or uj is always
traveling around si, we say that uj has a probability to be
a fake/compromised user targeting ui or si in the attack.
Thus, uj may not be trusted by ui or si. We first define
two types of distances.
Definition 3. User-User Distance. Given a road network
G(J, S) and two users ui and uj , we use d
u
t (ui, uj) to rep-
resent the coarse distance between ui and uj at time t.
When ui and uj appear together in a same cloaked region
R, dut (ui, uj) = 0. In other cases, d
u
t (ui, uj) = SJ(ui, uj).
Here, SJ(ui, uj) is equal to the number of the junctions in
the shortest path between the locations of ui and uj in a
road network.
Definition 4. User-Location Distance. Given a road net-
work G(J, S), a user ui located at a road segment si,
and a road segment sj , we use d
s
t to represent the coarse
distance between ui and sj at time t. When ui is in a
cloaked region R including sj , d
s
t (ui, sj) = 0. Otherwise,
dst (ui, sj) = SS(si, sj), where SS(si, sj) is equal to the
number of junctions in the shortest path between si and
sj .
For example, in Figure 3, dut (u1, fu4) = 0 since u1 and
fu4 are in the same cloaked region. d
u
t (u1, u9) = 3 as there
are three junctions in the shortest path between u1 and
u9. Similarly, d
s
t (u1, Seg3) = 0 since the cloaked region
includes both u1 and Seg3; d
s
t (u1, Seg9) = 1 because there
is one junction in the shortest path between u1 and Seg9.
Based on the definitions 3 and 4, we then present two
types of user-user trust functions and two types of user-
location trust functions. The user-user trust functions
present the trust between users while the user-location
trust functions indicate the trust values from locations to
users.
Definition 5. Coarse-grained User-User Trust Function.
Given a road network G(J, S), two users ui and uj trav-
eling in G and a time interval τ , the coarse-grained user
trust between ui and uj is
∑
t∈τ
cutut (ui, uj). Here,
cutut (ui, uj) =
{
1, dut (ui, uj) = 0
0, dut (ui, uj) > 0
Definition 6. Coarse-grained User-Location Trust Func-
tion. Given a road network G(J, S), a user ui traveling in
G, a road segment sj (sj ∈ J) and a time interval τ , the




cltst (ui, sj). Here,
cltst (ui, sj) =
{
1, dst (ui, sj) = 0
0, dst (ui, sj) > 0
Definition 7. Fine-grained User-User Trust Function.
Given a road network G(J, S), two users ui and uj travel-
ing in G and a time interval τ , the fine-grained user trust
between ui and uj is
∑
t∈τ
futut (ui, uj), where
futut (ui, uj) =
{
1, dut (ui, uj) = 0
xdut (ui, uj)
−y
, dut (ui, uj) > 0
Here, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, 0 < xdut (ui, sj)−y < 1.
Definition 8. Fine-grained User-Location Trust Function.
Given a road network G(J, S), a user ui traveling in G,
and a road segment sj (sj ∈ J) and a time interval τ , the




fltst (ui, sj), where
fltst (ui, sj) =
{
1, dst (ui, sj) = 0
xdst (ui, sj)
−y
, dst (ui, sj) > 0
Here, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, 0 < xdst (ui, sj)−y < 1.
In both definition 7 and 8, users outside the cloaked
regions are not simply considered to be innocent. Their
degree of suspicion can be controlled by adjusting the pa-
rameters x and y. Specifically, by choosing a larger x while
a smaller y, the user ui outside the cloaked region con-
taining uj or sj obtains higher fut
u
t (ui, uj) or flt
s
t (ui, sj),
thus becoming more suspicious. In contrast, by choosing a
smaller x while a larger y, users outside the cloaked regions
become less suspicious. In this paper, we set x = 1 and
y = 2, which considers users closer to the cloaked regions
to be suspicious but their degree of suspicion is much lower
than that of the users inside the cloaked region. Note that
the time window τ in the definitions 5 - 8 is generally de-
fined by AS. The value is same for all users. An example
of such a time window could be 24 hours.
Based on definitions 5 and 7, when ui and uj are in-
cluded in the same cloaked region or they are close to each
other, the values of
∑
t∈τ




are higher. The smaller distance between ui and uj also




cutut (ui, uj) and
∑
t∈τ
futut (ui, uj) refer
to the lower trust between ui and uj . Similarly, in the







fltst (ui, sj) refer to the smaller distance between
ui and sj and this suggests the lower trust from sj to ui.
In addition, compared to the coarse-grained trust func-
tions (definitions 5 and 6), the fine-grained trust functions
(definitions 7 and 8) are more restricted; users are proba-
bly regarded as potential attacker nodes even when they
are just a bit close to a target but they are not included
in the same cloaked region with the target. Instinctively,
these fine-grained trust functions would be more effective
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to defend against the attacks, and they are more useful for
handling the attack scenarios where fake users are placed
a bit far away from a target for the attacks. However, the
potential issue with the fine-grained trust functions is that
they may consider more trusted users as suspicious users
than the coarse-grained trust functions. Such an issue may
make AS construct a larger size of a cloaked region and it
may lower the quality of the location based services for
users. We compare these two types of trust functions in
Section 4.
Next, based on the above trust functions, we introduce
the definitions of the local trust and the global trust which
are used to capture the trust values between users and
between users and road segments in a more comprehensive
way. Based on these, we define the k-Trustee.
3.2.2. k-Trustee
In order to define the local trust and the global trust,
we first define the notions of e-stalker and f-stationary
based on the proposed trust functions.
Definition 9. e-stalker . Given a road network G(J, S),
two users ui and uj traveling in G and a time interval τ , we
say that uj is an e-stalker for ui when
∑
t∈τ




futut (ui, uj) ≥ euil . Here, euil is a parameter
defined by ui indicating his privacy setting for e-stalker.
Definition 10. f-stationary . Given a road networkG(J, S),
a user ui located at a road segment si, another user uj lo-
cated at a road segment sj , and a time interval τ , we say
that uj is an f-stationary of ui when
∑
t∈τ




fltst (uj , si) ≥ fuil . Here, fuil is defined by ui speci-
fying the privacy setting for f-stationary.
From these two definitions, we can see that e-stalker
characterizes users who may be utilized by an attacker
to identify and/or infer a specific user’s location while f-
stationary characterizes users who may be employed by
the attacker to identify users who are visiting a specific lo-
cation. Next, we define the Local Trust specifying whether
a user trusts another locally.
Definition 11. Local Trust . Given two users ui and uj
traveling in a road network G(J, S), a time window τ ,
ui’s location si at time t (t ∈ τ), and ui’s local trust
parameters euil and f
ui
l , we say that uj is currently a
local trusted user of ui, denoted as uj ∈ Uuilt (t), only


















fltst (uj , si) < f
ui
l .
Fake users used for a particular target can be reused by
an attacker to attack a new target; these fake users may be
initially trusted by the new target. To limit re-usability of
fake users, we present the notion of global trust as follows.
Definition 12. Global Trust . Given two users ui and
uj traveling in a road network G(J, S), a time window τ ,
ui’s location si at time t (t ∈ τ), and ui’s global trust
parameters euig and f
ui
g , we say that uj is globally trusted
by ui, denoted as uj ∈ Uuigt (t), only when there are less
than euig users who regard uj as the e-stalker, and less
than fuig users who regard uj as the the f-stationary.
Now, when a fake user has been adopted for attacking
enough users and/or road segments in the past, he is un-
likely to be globally trusted by many other users. Hence,
the re-usability of this fake user for a new target will be
restricted.
We define a trusted user of a specific user by consider-
ing both local and global trust as follows.
Definition 13. A Trustee of a Specific User . Given two
users ui and uj traveling in a road network G(J, S), a time
window τ , ui’s location si at time t (t ∈ τ), ui’s local trust
parameters euil and f
ui
l , and ui’s global trust parameters
euig and f
ui
g , we say that uj is a trustee of ui, denoted as
uj ∈ UuiT (t), only when uj ∈ Uuilt (t) and uj ∈ Uuigt (t).
In the rest of the paper, when we say uj is trusted by
ui, it will refer to local and global trust. We next present
the notion of k-Trustee for a user as follows.
Definition 14. k-Trustee of a User . Given a road net-
work G(J, S), an Anonymization Server (AS) and a time
window τ , a user ui travels in G while requesting a location-
based service. ui has a privacy setting k
ui for k-Anonymity
and AS constructs a cloaked region Ruit for ui at time t
(t ∈ τ). UuiT (Ruit ) represents the trusted users of ui in the
cloaked region Ruit at t. We say that k-Trustee is guar-




t ); i.e., |UuiT (Ruit )| ≥ kui .
Note that we assume that ui always trusts himself (i.e.,
ui ∈ UuiT (Ruit )).
The trustees of a specific user ui are the least likely to
be fake users since these users have the lowest probability
of either stalking ui or attacking the location where ui is
currently is. When there are at least k trustees in a cloaked
region for user ui, the probability of distinguishing ui in
the cloaked region is at most 1/kui . Thus, ui’s privacy re-
quirement for k-Anonymity is guaranteed. Note that it is
possible that fake users may be identified as trustees of a
specific user ui in the initial stages. However, when these
fake users continue to stalk ui or attack road segments in-
cluding ui, their trust values with respect to ui will keep
decreasing, as per the proposed definitions. Eventually,
they will not become the trustees of ui any more in the
time window τ . In this case, an attacker has to use new
fake users to launch the location injection attacks on ui. In
addition, it is also possible that an authentic and not com-
promised user may not be always identified as a trustee of
any user in terms of his trajectory. It is a false-negative
but there is no impact for this authentic user to request
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anonymity service from AS and various location-based ser-
vices from LBSPs. The only potential issue is that AS
may construct a larger cloaked region for the authentic
user and hence the quality of the location-based service
may decrease.
Based on the definition of k-Trustee of a user, we define
the notion of guarantee of k-Trustee as follows.
Definition 15. Guarantee of k-Trustee in a Cloaked Re-
gion. Given a cloaked region R and a time instant t,
a user set U(R) indicates a set of users in R. We say
that k-Trustee is guaranteed in R at t if and only if k-
Trustee is guaranteed for each user in R at t; i.e., ∀ui ∈
U(R), |UuiT (Ruit , t)| ≥ kui .
Next, we present the cloaking-based location privacy
mechanism which guarantees k-Trustee in any cloaked re-
gion constructed by AS.
3.3. Cloaking-based Location Privacy Mechanism Guaran-
teeing k-Trustee
Here, we first present the proposed k-Trustee cloaking
based privacy framework. We then discuss and compare
several expansion schemes and finally show the k-Trustee
cloaking algorithm.
3.3.1. k-Trustee Framework
The key idea of our proposed cloaking-based location
privacy framework is to adopt the notion of k-Trustee in-
stead of the k-Anonymity to enhance a user’s location pri-
vacy and mitigate the location injection attacks. We also
suggest to place a sensor agent at each road segment of
a road network in the original location privacy preserv-
ing framework shown in Figure 1. The sensor agent at
a road segment is able to communicate with AS and the
users close to the road segment. It is used to compute f-
stationary values for users. After that, it sends the related
f-stationary values to AS. Note that the sensor agents are
not necessary if the computations of the f-stationary val-
ues are done by users’ mobile devices. To do this, user ui
should use cloaked regions previously received from AS
within the past time period τ . For any user that ap-
peared at least once in these recent cloaked regions, user
ui should count the number of times that this user ap-




cltst (uj , si) < f
ui
l to compute local f-stationary (Def-
inition 10, 11). Finally, the local f-stationary can be sent
to AS to compute the global f-stationary (Definition 12).
We note that the f-stationary values computed by mobile
devices may be less accurate than the ones computed by
the sensor agents because the cloaked regions owned by
mobile devices may not contain enough information about
the surrounding users. Ideally, a sensor agent placed on
the road segments can provide precise information about
the users. However, it may not be entirely practical. In
such cases, when users are away from the sensor agents,
the f-stationary values can be computed by their mobile
devices and when users are close to the sensor agents, the
f-stationary values can be computed by the sensor agents.
For example, when there are ten segments and ten other
users appeared at least once in ui’s recent cloaked regions
and only two of the segments have sensor agents, ui can use
mobile devices to compute a portion of local f-stationary
values by counting the number of times that each of the
ten users appeared at each of the eight no-sensor segment
and importing the results into
∑
t∈τ
cltst (uj , si) < f
ui
l . Later,
at AS, this portion of local f-stationary values can be com-
bined with the f-stationary values of the two with-sensor
segments reported by the sensor agents to offer complete
f-stationary information for u.
In this framework, a user u first needs to specify his pri-











Here, RuM denotes the maximum size of a constructed
cloaked region accepted by u; and TuM indicates the max-
imum wait time accepted by u for the response for his
location request. RuM and T
u
M are usually used by u to
specify the quality of service. In this paper, RuM refers to
the maximum number of road segments in a road network.
When the number of road segments in the cloaked region
is larger than RuM , u’s location request will be ignored. p
u
needs to be sent to AS and sensor agents at road segments
before the anonymous service is provided.
The process to compute trustees involves the following
steps. First, e-stalkers are computed and labeled by the
users. To compute e-stalkers, user ui should use cloaked
regions previously received from AS within the past time
period τ . Specifically, for a user uj that appeared at least
once in these recent cloaked regions, user ui should count
the number of the recent cloaked regions that contains uj .
If the result is not less than euil , uj will be labeled as a
e-stalker of ui by ui. To query AS for a cloaked region,
ui should compute his e-stalkers and send the results to
AS along with his current location suit and privacy pa-
rameters pui . As a result, AS knows the e-stalkers of each
user. Second, the computation of f-stationary is completed
by sensor agents and AS together. We have assumed that
each road segment has a sensor agent to continuously mea-
sure the f-stationary value
∑
t∈τ
cltst (u, s) for nearby users.
For instance, once a user uj enters the communication
area of the sensor agent located at segment si, the value∑
t∈τ
cltst (uj , si) will be continuously updated by the sensor
agent until the value becomes zero. Therefore, if AS needs
to determine whether or not user uj currently located at
suit = si is a f-stationary of user ui, AS should get the value∑
t∈τ
cltst (uj , si) from the sensor agent of si and compare it
with the fuil declared by ui. If the result is not less than
fuil , uj will be labeled as a f-stationary of ui by AS. With
the knowledge of both e-stalker and f-stationary, AS can
label a user uj to be locally trusted by another user ui if
uj is neither an e-stalker nor a f-stationary of ui. In addi-
tion, with the global knowledge about the number of times
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that uj has been labeled as e-stalker and/or f-stationary
by other users, AS can compare the results with parame-
ters euig and f
ui
g declared by ui to determine whether uj
can be globally trusted by ui or not. Finally, if uj can be
both locally and globally trusted by ui, AS will label uj
to be a trustee of ui.
An essential issue in this framework is the strategies
for expanding a cloaked region where k-Trustee is guaran-
teed for each user. Generally, there are two approaches
for expanding the cloaked region [4] in the literature: the
Bottom-Up cloaking and the Top-Down cloaking. The
Bottom-Up cloaking approach starts the cloaking process
by taking a road segment as a candidate cloaked region. If
it cannot satisfy users’ privacy requirements, the Bottom-
Up cloaking approach will start the expansion process to
enlarge it by including more neighboring road segments till
all the users’ privacy requirements in the cloaked region
are satisfied. On the other hand, the Top-Down cloaking
approach first selects the entire graph as an initial candi-
date cloaked region and it aims to partition it to various
smaller cloaked regions where none of the users’ privacy
requirements is violated. In this paper, we focus on the
Bottom-Up cloaking approach since we feel that it is more
straightforward and easier to be utilized in a road network.
3.3.2. Expansion Schemes
We proposed the following three cloaked region expan-
sion schemes in the proposed k-Trustee framework: ran-
dom expansion, greedy expansion and hybrid expansion.
Note that these are deployed in AS.
Random Expansion. Given a cloaked region R, the
random expansion approach randomly picks a road seg-
ment from the neighbor set NSR and adds it to R. This
process is repeated until the expanded R guarantees the
k-Trustee requirement for each user in R.
Greedy Expansion. The greedy expansion focuses on
constructing a smaller size of the cloaked region at each
expansion step. Given a cloaked region R, it first com-
putes the neighbor set NSR when R does not satisfy the k-
Trustee requirement of each and every user. After that,in
each expansion step, it tries to find the best road segment
in NSR that can satisfy the users’ privacy requirements as
soon as possible. It then adds the road segment to R. It
keeps adding the best road segment to R until every user’s
requirement of k-Trustee is guaranteed. Below, we define
the approach to identify the best road segment to add at
each step, as follows:
Definition 16. ”Best First”. Given a road networkG(J, S)
and a cloaked region R where not all users’ k-Trustee pri-
vacy requirements are satisfied, let NSR be the neighbor
set at time t. For each road segment si ∈ NSR, let p(si)
be a profit function and let c(si) be a cost function. p(si)
denotes the number of pairs of trusted users between a
user in si and another user in R. It can be calculated as
p(si) =
∑
Tr(ui, uj), ui ∈ U(si), uj ∈ U(R), where
Tr(ui, uj) =
{
1/(kuj − 1), ui ∈ UujT (R ∪ si, t)
0, otherwise
c(si) indicates the number of additional trusted users re-
quired for users at si when si is added to R. c(si) can





say that si is the best road segment to add to R when
the value of p(si)− c(si) is the largest, compared to other
road segments in NSR. When there are more than one
best road segments, we randomly pick one of them and
add it to R.
Example: We illustrate the working of the above ex-
pansion scheme as follows. Figure 5 shows the steps of a
greedy expansion for u1. fu1, fu2 and fu3 in the figure
are fake users. We first assume that every fake user has
a very low privacy requirement (kfu1 = kfu2 = kfu3 =
2) and trust any other user locally and globally in or-
der to achieve the best attack results. Authentic users
(ui, i ∈ [1, 12]) do not trust these fake users globally but
they trust any other authentic user globally; i.e., Uuigt =
{u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8, u9, u10, u11, u12}, i ∈ [1, 12]. Au-
thentic users have privacy settings for the k-Trustee as:
ku3 = ku4 = ku6 = ku7 = ku9 = ku10 = ku11 = 3, ku1 =
ku2 = ku5 = 4, ku8 = ku12 = 5. Their current trustees




lt = {u4, u5, u6, u7, u8}, Uu2lt =
{u6, u7, u10}, Uu3lt = {u5, u7, u12}, Uu4lt = {u5, u6}, Uu5lt =
{u1, u4, u6}, Uu6lt = {u1, u4, u5, u7, u9}, Uu7lt = {u4, u6, u8},
Uu8lt = {u1, u2, u4, u5, u6}, Uu11lt = {u2, u5, u6, u7, u8}, Uu12lt =
{u2, u5, u6, u7, u9}.
To construct a cloaked region for u1, initially, in Figure
5, AS sets the candidate cloaked region Ru1 = {s16} and
NSR
u1
= {s12, s15, s17, s18, s21, s22}. Since ku1 = 4 and
there are less than 4 trustees in Ru1 , AS needs to expand
Ru1 by adding the best road segment in NSR
u1
. Given
s12, U(s12) = {u8, u9}, p(s1) = 1/3 since only u8 is one
of the trusted users of u1. c(s1) = 3/4 + 1/2 = 5/4 as u8
needs 3 more trusted users and u9 needs 1 more trusted
user. p(s12)−c(s12) = −11/12. Similarly, p(s15)−c(s15) =
0−2 = −2, p(s17)− c(s17) = 0−1 = −1, p(s18)− c(s18) =
0 − 2 = −2, p(s21) − c(s21) = 1/3 − 1 = −2/3, p(s22) −
c(s22) = 1 − 0 = 1. Hence, s22 is selected according to
definition 16 and CRu1 = {s16, s22}. We also find that
every user’s privacy requirement is satisfied in Ru1 now
and henceRu1 = {s16, s22} is selected as the cloaked region
for u1.
We can see that the greedy expansion tends to min-
imize the size of a cloaked region while the random ex-
pansion may generate a cloaked region with a larger size
which can decrease the quality of the location-based ser-
vices (QoS). However, the greedy expansion may be more
vulnerable to the replay attack [40] where an attacker
knows the preference of the expansion process and he can
possibly replay the anonymization process to identify a
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Figure 5: An example of the greedy expansion. In this example,
u1 requires a cloaked region that should satisfy ku1 = 4. Ini-
tially, the candidate cloaked region Ru1 = {s16} and NSRu1 =
{s12, s15, s17, s18, s21, s22}. To expand the cloaked region to sat-
isfy ku1 = 4, the greedy expansion computes the difference between
profit and cost when each segment in NSR
u1 is added into Ru1 and
selects the segment s22 with the largest difference.
user’s exact location. To balance the QoS and the re-
silience against the replay attack, we further propose a
hybrid expansion which combines the random expansion
and the greedy expansion.
Hybrid Expansion. When a cloaked region R needs
to be expanded, AS randomly adopts either the random
expansion or the greedy one to add a road segment to R
in the hybrid expansion scheme. AS continues to do the
same expansions until every user’s privacy requirement is
satisfied in R.
For example, in Figure 6, every user’s privacy setting
is same as the one in Figure 5. Initially, Ru1 = {s16} and
NSR
u1
= {s12, s15, s17, s18, s21, s22}. In the first expan-
sion, we assume that the random expansion is employed
and s21 is added into R
u1 , so Ru1 = {s16, s21}. In the
second expansion, the greedy expansion is adopted. s22 is
chosen based on definition 16 and it is added to Ru1 . Now,
we can see that k-Trustee is guaranteed for every user in
Ru1 = {s16, s21, s22}.
3.3.3. k-Trustee Cloaking Algorithm
The cloaking algorithm that guarantees k-Trustee is
shown in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, the cloaking
process, run by AS, first initializes a user set CU indi-
cating users who have been processed by the algorithm,
the output set and the expansion scheme adopted by the
algorithm (line 1-3). It then computes the trusted users
for each user at t based on the user’s privacy setting pui
(line 4-5). After that, it randomly selects one user who
has not been processed and starts to construct a cloaked
region where each user’s privacy requirement is satisfied
using the selected expansion scheme (line 6-12). If the size
of the cloaked region is larger than the required one for a
Figure 6: An example of the hybrid expansion. In this example,
to expand the cloaked region Ru1 = {s16} to satisfy ku1 = 4, in
the first step, the hybrid expansion randomly selects the random
expansion and therefore randomly selecting s21 from NSR
u1 . Then,
since ku1 = 4 is still not met, in the second step, the hybrid expansion
randomly selects the greedy expansion and therefore selecting s22
according to the ‘best first’ computation.
user in the constructed cloaked region, the anonymity ser-
vice is not available for that user (line 13-16). However, the
AS will continuously include that user into future cloaked
regions until the maximum response time RuM of that user
has passed. In that case, the query of that user is rejected
(i.e., if its k-trustee requirement is not met). Since only
the query of that user fails, we believe its influence to other
users is not big. Lastly, the cloaking process stops when
all the users have been processed. Note that, to simplify,
the restriction of the time TuiM defined by a user ui are
not involved in this algorithm. We recommend that it be
Algorithm 1: Cloaking Algorithm Guaranteeing k-
Trustee
Input: A road network G(J, S), active users in a user set U
traveling in G, a time instant t, and a privacy setting












M ) of each user ui ∈ U






1 CU ← ∅;
2 RS ← ∅;
3 es ← getExpansionScheme();
4 foreach ui ∈ U do
5 getTrustees(ui, p
ui , t);
6 while CU 6= U do
7 ui = pickAnUnprocessedUser(U , CU);
8 CR
ui




10 sj ← getExpanded(CRuit ,es);
11 CR
ui
t ← CRuit + sj ;
12 R
ui
t ← CRuit ;
13 foreach uj ∈ Ruit do
14 CU ← uj ;
15 if Size(R
uj







18 RS ← (uj , Rujt );
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handled by a user’s mobile device.
Note that the guarantees of POI l-Diversity [4] and
road segment s-Diversity [40] can be additionally ensured
by the k-Trustee cloaking-based location privacy preserv-
ing mechanism. The k-Trustee cloaking process can first
satisfy l-Diversity or s-Diversity requirement for every users
in the region and then it satisfies the k-Trustee require-
ment. It can also first satisfy every user’s k-Trustee re-
quirement and then it guarantees the l-Diversity or s-
Diversity requirement. We argue that the latter approach
may be more appropriate when most of the users are strict
to their trusted users by setting high values for k-Trustee
requirements. It is because the guarantee of k-Trustee usu-
ally also ensures l-Diversity and s-Diversity. On the other
hand, the former probably works more efficiently when
there are fewer fake users in the road network and users
are less strict in defining their trusted users.
4. Simulations
In this section, we first present the results of loca-
tion injection attacks in the cloaking mechanism (called
the general cloaking) guaranteeing only k-Anonymity and
the one supporting both k-Anonymity and s-Diversity (re-
ferred as XStar [40]). We choose the general cloaking algo-
rithm as the baseline approach and the XStar algorithm as
the advanced approach. We want to demonstrate that the
location injection attack is effective for both k-anonymity
and s-diversity. We also want to compare the performance
of a location injection attack when it is launched over a
cloaking algorithm purely designed for k-anonymity and a
cloaking algorithm designed for both k-anonymity and s-
diversity. After evaluating the location injection attacks,
we simulate the proposed k-Trustee cloaking algorithm and
demonstrate its effectiveness against the location injection
attacks.
4.1. Experiment Setup
In our experiments, we use the GT Mobile simulator
[37] to generate trajectories of 30,000 users moving in the
DeKalb County in Atlanta regions of Georgia, which con-
tains 37996 segments and 27647 junctions. We assume
that each user is active during the travel in this road net-
work and he has a location-based request from a specific
location service provider every second. We also assume
that AS, users, sensor agents at road segments can com-
pute various intermediate results and communicate with
each other instantly. The simulator runs for 10 minutes
and each user has 600 location-based requests in total.
Note that we assume that all of these 30,000 users are
authentic users.
4.1.1. Privacy Settings
Given any authentic user u in the road network, we
first set ku for k-Anonymity and k-Trustee as a randomly
chosen value from 2 to 10. We also set ru (used by XStar
to support s-Diversity) as randomly chosen values between
2 and 5. The maximum size RuM (the number of the road
segments) of the cloaked region accepted by u is a random
value chosen from the set {20ru, 30ru, 40ru, 50ru}. We
then set eul and f
u
l as random values between 20 and 40,
respectively. The global privacy requirements, eug and f
u
g
are both set as 5 for u. Note that, in the simulations, we
assume that each user can get the cloaked results from AS
immediately and we do not set the maximum waiting time
(TuM ) for u.
Regarding each fake user fu created by the attacker,
we choose the least privacy restrictions for him; i.e., we









As shown in Section 2.4, the location injection attack
has two types of targets: user targets and location tar-
gets. In the simulation, we randomly select 1,000 out of
30,000 authentic users as the user targets. Regarding lo-
cation targets, we focus on the road segments which have
at least one user during the simulation, i.e., the average
traffic of the road segment (the number of users visiting a
road segment) is no less than 1. There are 9,033 such road
segments in the dataset and we randomly select 1,000 of
them as location targets. In addition, we choose 10 trajec-
tories as the targets for the fixed-trajectory attack. These
selected one consist of 10 connected road segments and
there are total of 95 authentic users traveling on them.
4.1.3. Fake User Creations
We simulate fake users according to the proposed three
attack models (refer to Section 2.4) as follows:
Stalking Attack. We assume that an attacker ini-
tially knows the initial location (a road segment) of the
targeted user by injecting enough fake users into the road
network (refer to Section 2.4.1). We then generate 6, 8
and 10 fake users, respectively, for a targeted user when
the general cloaking is adopted. We also create 10, 15
and 20 fake users, respectively, for a targeted user when
the XStar is applied. These fake users travel either in the
same segment with the targeted user or few segment-based
distant away from the targeted user as described in Section
2.4.1.
Fixed-location Attack. At a targeted road segment,
we generate 2, 4 and 6 fake users, respectively, when the
general cloaking is adopted. We also create 6, 8 and 10
fake users placed at a targeted road segment, respectively,
when the XStar is applied. The location injection attack
needs more fake users to compromise the XStar algorithm
successfully. Unlike the general cloaking algorithm that
only guarantee k-Anonymity, the XStar algorithm is de-
signed for both k-Anonymity and s-Diversity. It is the
s-Diversity that makes the XStar algorithm harder to be
compromised. These fake users travel at the trajectory
described in Section 2.4.2.
Fixed-trajectory attack. Given a targeted trajec-
tory, we put 4, 6 and 8 fake users traveling at every road
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segment in the trajectory, respectively, in this attack. The
goal of such an attack is to identify users who travel ex-
actly on these trajectories.
Note that the times of the attacks conducted for each
target is 600 in our simulation since each user has a total
of 600 location-based requests during his travel in the road
network (refer to 4.1).
4.1.4. Measurements
In the simulations, we adopt the following measure-
ments to evaluate the location injection attacks and the
cloaking-based mechanism guaranteeing k-Trustee:
In-distinguishability DR : It indicates the in-distin-
guishability of a user (the number of trusted users) in
a cloaked region. Each user has specified its required
value (k) in the k-Anonymity and in the k-Trustee cloak-
ing mechanisms. The location injection attack aims to
compromise it by lowering its value. Note that fake users
do not contribute to DR for an attacker since they are
distinguishable for the attacker. A lower value of DR in-
dicates the lower location privacy protection. Thus, the
lower value of DR a location injection attack can achieve
the more successful the attack is.
Size of a Cloaked Region SR: It represents the in-
distinguishability of a road segment in a cloaked region. In
the XStar, each user specifies the privacy requirement for
SR. The location injection attacks may be able to lower
its value. In addition, we use it to demonstrate the quality
of service for the k-trustee cloaking-based mechanism.
Cloaking Failure Rate FR: In the XStar and the
k-Trustee cloaking mechanisms, a user usually needs to
define the maximum size of the cloaked region, i.e., the
maximum number of road segments in a cloaked region.
Given a user, we say the anonymity service is failed when
the size of the cloaked region for a user is larger than the
defined maximum size by the user. Then, RR generally
indicates how practical the cloaking-based mechanism is.
Attack Successful Rate AR: In an attack, given a
user and a cloaked region, when the number of the trusted
users in the cloaked region is smaller than a specified k
by the user, we say the attack is successful. The AR for a
user indicates how successful the location injection attacks
work for that user in general.
4.2. Attack Results of Location Injection Attacks
In the subsection, we present the results of the location
injection attacks on two road network-aware cloaking algo-
rithms guaranteeing k-Anonymity : 1) the general cloaking
algorithm with a random expansion; 2) XStar cloaking al-
gorithm [40] which preserves users’ location privacy with
the additional guarantee of s-Diversity.
Stalking Attacks on a General Cloaking Algo-
rithm. The attack results of the stalking attacks on the
general cloaking algorithm are shown in Figure 7. It demon-
strates the average DR (Figure 7.a) and the average AR
(Figure 7.b) for targeted users with their diverse k-Anonymity
Figure 7: Stalking Attacks on the General Cloaking Algorithm
requirements. From Figure 7.a, we can see that the stalk-
ing attacks can significantly downgrade the DR for tar-
geted users. When the stalking attacks are not launched,
the range of the DR for targeted users is between 12 and
13 with the guarantee of k-Anonymity for each user. How-
ever, when the attacks are launched, DR decreases to the
range of 3 and 6. When the required k in the k-Anonymity
specified by targeted users is larger than 6, we even find
that the average DR for these users is even lower than 6.
Such a result suggests the successes of the attacks. Figure
7.b also confirms the successes of the attacks by showing
that the average AR is more than 50% when the required k
of k-Anonymity is larger than 6. We also find that AR in-
creases with the increase of the required k. Such a result
reflects that the stalking attacks are more successful for
users with the more restricted k-Anonymity requirements.
Stalking Attacks on the XStar Algorithm. Fig-
ure 8 shows the stalking attack results on the XStar cloak-
ing algorithm. Figure 8.a demonstrates the average AR
for targeted users with their various k-Anonymity require-
ments while Figure 8.b indicates the average SR with users’
s-Diversity requirements. From Figure 8.a, we can see that
AR has a significant increase from 5% to 80% with the in-
creased value of the required k in the k-Anonymity. Such
a result shows that most attacks are successful. From Fig-
ure 8.b, we find that the attacks can dramatically decrease
values of SR from 10 to 5 causing the targeted users easier
to be distinguishable. However, since the required S of
s-Diversity defined by targeted users are between 2 and 5,
the stalking attacks cannot actually compromise the guar-
antee of s-Diversity. Lastly, we also find that the number
of fake users used in the attacks for the XStar cloaking
algorithm may not be able to significantly promote the
attack results from both graphs.
Fixed-location Attacks. The results of the fixed-
location attacks on the general cloaking algorithm are shown
in Figure 9. It shows that the average DR of users visiting
every targeted road segment. We can see that DR signif-
icantly decreases with the increasing number of injected
fake users. When 2 fake users are injected at a targeted
segment, it seems that the k-Anonymity requirements for
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Figure 8: Stalking Attacks on the XStar Algorithm
users visiting the targeted segment are still satisfied in
most attack instances. However, when 4 or 6 fake users
are placed at a targeted segment, DR deceases significantly
than the required value and users’ k-Anonymity require-
ments are compromised. In our simulation, we also find
that AR is between 20% and 40% when 2 fake users are
placed. When 4 or 6 fake users are injected, the range
of AR has a remarkable increase and it is between 60%
and 90%. These results also confirm the successes of the
fixed-location attacks on the general cloaking algorithm.
In addition, we simulated the fixed-location attacks on the
XStar cloaking algorithm. However, such attacks are less
successful and the average AR is below 20%. We believe
that the enforcement of the s-Diversity can mitigate the
fixed-location attacks to some extent.
Figure 9: Fixed-location Attacks on the General Cloaking
Algorithm
Fixed-trajectory attacks. We also performed the
fixed-trajectory attacks for the chosen trajectories in order
to identify users who follow these trajectories. The results
of the attacks on a general cloaking algorithm are shown
in Figure 10. Among the 95 targets in the fixed-trajectory
attacks, the percentage of compromised users rises from
0.52 to 0.96 when the number of placed fake users are in-
creased from 4 to 8. These numbers reflect the successes of
the fixed-trajectory attacks. We also simulated the fixed-
trajectory attacks under the XStar clocking algorithm.
However, the attacks are not successful and we cannot
Figure 10: Results of fixed-trajectory attacks
identify the trajectory of any user in terms of the require-
ments of s-Diversity defined by users. To have a successful
fixed-trajectory attack, all the constructed cloaked regions
from AS for a user should have only one road segment in
order to determine the user’s trajectory. The cloaked re-
gion from the XStar includes more than one road segment
and hence the attack cannot be successful.
4.3. Location Injection Attacks on k-Trustee Cloaking Al-
gorithm
In this subsection, we utilize the same fake users for
the same targeted users and locations as those used in the
Section 4.2. We simulate various location injection attacks
on the k-Trustee cloaking mechanism. Note that, in these
simulations, when users additionally specify requirements
for the diversity of the road segments, we first guarantee
their k-Trustee requirements and then meet those for the
diversity of road segments.
4.3.1. General Attack Results
We first perform location injections for targets on the
k-Trustee cloaking mechanism adopting the coarse-grained
trust functions and the random expansion scheme.
Figure 11 shows the results of the stalking attacks on
the k-Trustee cloaking mechanism. Figure 11.a indicates
the average AR for targeted users who has different k-
Anonymity requirements and do not specify the diversity
of road segments. Figure 11.b demonstrates the average
AR for targeted users who do specify the diversity of road
segments. From this figure, we can see that less than 5%
of the stalking attack instances on the k-Trustee cloak-
ing mechanism are successful. Compared to those success-
ful rates shown in Figures 7 and 8, we can conclude that
the k-Trustee cloaking mechanism can significantly defend
against the stalking attacks.
In addition, our simulation results for the fixed-location
attacks on the k-Trustee cloaking mechanism demonstrate
that less than 4% of the attack instances on average are
successful for targeted road segments when users do not
specify the diversity of road segments. When users do
specify this requirement, our results show that the aver-
age AR is less than 1.5%. Compared to the corresponding
results of the same attacks on the general cloaking algo-
rithm in Section 4.2, we can say that the fixed-location
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Figure 11: Results of the Attacks on the k-Trustee Cloaking
Mechanism
Figure 12: Coarse-grained Trust Functions vs. Fine-grained Trust
Functions
attacks become significantly less successful when the k-
Trustee cloaking mechanism is applied. Furthermore, we
performed the fixed-trajectory attacks on the k-Trustee
cloaking mechanism. However, we cannot identify any
user’s trajectory in this case.
Based on the above results, we can conclude that the k-
Trustee cloaking mechanism is indeed effective to mitigate
the location injection attacks.
4.3.2. k-Trustee Cloaking Mechanism with Different Trust
Functions
We next compare the effectiveness of the k-Trustee
cloaking mechanisms using different trust functions (coarse-
grained trust and fine-grained trust functions) as discussed
in Section 3.2. We focus on the stalking attacks using 8
fake users for each targeted users. We also assume that
a random expansion is adopted in these k-Trustee cloak-
ing mechanisms and users do not specify the diversity of
road segments. We then perform the stalking attacks for
the targeted users using different trust functions in the
k-Trustee cloaking mechanism and the results are shown
in Figure 12. It shows the average AR for each targeted
users. We can see that both of the coarse-grained and fine-
grained trust functions adopted by the k-Trustee cloaking
mechanisms are effective to mitigate the location injection
attacks. As expected, the fine-grained trust functions can
achieve a better resilience by approximately decreasing 1%
of AR by average.
Figure 13: Results of the Attacks using Different Expansion
Schemes in the k-Trustee Cloaking Mechanism
4.3.3. k-Trustee Cloaking Mechanism with Different Ex-
pansion Schemes
In Section 3.3.2, we discussed three different expan-
sion schemes for the k-Trustee cloaking mechanism and
we compare them in this subsection. We first focus on
the stalking attacks using 10 fake users for each targeted
user who also specifies the diversity of road segments. We
then adopt the coarse-grained trust functions for the k-
Trustee cloaking mechanisms using the random expansion,
the greedy expansion and the hybrid expansion. Our re-
sults are shown in Figure 13. Figure 13.a demonstrates the
average AR for targeted users with different k-Anonymity
requirements. We can see that attacks on the the k-Trustee
cloaking mechanism using the greedy expansion can achieve
the lowest AR while those on the k-Trustee cloaking mech-
anism adopting the random expansion have the highest
AR. Figure 13.b indicates the average size of cloaked re-
gions, SR, for targeted users with different requirements
for the diversity of road segments. We can find that the
random expansion induces AS to construct the largest
cloaked regions while the greedy expansion induces AS to
construct the smallest cloaked regions. Based on these
results, we can say that the greedy expansion has the
best resilience against location injection attacks and it can
achieve the best quality of the location-based services.
4.4. Discussion
In our experiments, we noticed that the location injec-
tion attacks are not successful for some user and location
targets. We analyzed these targets and found out that
there are always enough number of users traveling with
the targeted users and/or traveling on the targeted seg-
ments. As a result, the location injection attacks are not
successful. In addition, the k-Trustee cloaking mechanism
using fine-grained functions may have the performance is-
sue due to the complexity of algorithm. Such a mechanism
needs to maintain two relatively larger matrices: user to
user matrix which dynamically records the trust between
each pair of users based on their distance, and location
to user matrix that dynamically calculates the trust be-
tween each pair of road segment and user based on their
distance. We presented a framework with the additional
sensor agent at every road segment in Section 3.3.1, which




Location privacy has been an active area of research
for decades. To protect users’ location privacy during us-
age of location based services (LBS), various location pri-
vacy protection mechanisms have been proposed. Based
on their core ideas, these mechanisms can be broadly cat-
egorized into approaches that use dummies [29, 32], space
transformation [18, 28], mix-zone [6, 36], encryption [31],
spatial cloaking [5, 10, 17, 20, 21, 27, 30, 34, 40, 43] and dif-
ferential privacy [3, 22, 42]. The basic ideas behind these
techniques are briefly discussed as follows. The dummy-
based approaches replace real user locations with fake loca-
tions that are related to the real ones. The schemes based
on spatial transformation transform data to another space
to encode relationship between data and queries. The
mix-zone solutions change pseudonyms of users who en-
ter the zones so that adversaries are unable to link leaving
users with entering users. The encryption-based schemes
use cryptographic techniques to protect privacy of loca-
tion data. For instance, in [31], Li et al. applied CP-
ABE [7] to extend binary access to location data to a
fine-grained access control model. The spatial cloaking
mechanisms, as the most widely studied category, usu-
ally generate cloaked regions that satisfy privacy require-
ments such as k-anonymity [20] for users and send such
cloaked regions to LBS providers. More recent work have
introduced the newer privacy paradigm of differential pri-
vacy [16], to location privacy protection [3, 22, 42]. By
carefully applying differential privacy protection mecha-
nisms (e.g. Laplace Mechanism [16], Exponential Mecha-
nism [33]) to the location data, the personal location infor-
mation in the disclosed statistical output can be protected.
Among these techniques, we have focused on studying the
spatial cloaking technique in this work because it is the one
that has been widely studied with respect to various set-
tings (e.g., centralized [17, 34], P2P [13, 14]) as well as var-
ious problem statements (e.g., snapshot queries [17], tra-
jectories [12]). While differential privacy provides a more
formal and rigorous privacy guarantee against background
knowledge attacks, it can result in a higher perturbation
and may provide a lower data utility compared to spatial
cloaking techniques. Thus, in cases where there is a lack of
background knowledge and when the risks of such attacks
are minimal, the spatial cloaking techniques are likely to
provide a higher data utility compared to differential pri-
vacy. A unified framework for location privacy that offers
a systematic view by formalizing the problem, adversaries,
mechanisms and metrics can be found in [39].
The notion of spatial cloaking was first introduced by
Beresford and Stajano [5]. From then on, many centralized
approaches have been proposed, which essentially leverage
a centralized anonymization server to deploy the spatial
cloaking algorithms. Among these approaches, Gruteser
and Grunwald [20] presented the Interval Cloak that guar-
antees k-Anonymity in the cloaked region to preserve users’
location privacy from LBS providers. Gedik and Liu [17]
introduced the CliqueCloak where users’ personalized pri-
vacy requirements for k-Anonymity are satisfied. Mok-
bel et al. [34] designed Casper that extended the Interval
Cloak to the grid network with the privacy-aware query
processor. Hoh et al. [21] developed a time-to-confusion
criterion as the duration over which an attacker could track
a target. Based on it, they designed an uncertainty-aware
path cloaking mechanism that guarantee k-Anonymity for
all users and hide users’ trajectories. Kalnis et al. [27]
improved the previous cloaking algorithms by introduc-
ing the Hilbert Cloak. The Hilbert Cloak satisfies reci-
procity that is sufficient for users to achieve the spatial
k-Anonymity for their location requests. Cui et al. [15]
extended the Hilbert Cloak by considering average query
density to make anonymity set satisfy both reciprocity and
uniformity. Zheng et al. [45] proposed an approach that
selects a sub-area from the clocked region that may or may
not include the real user location to prevent side informa-
tion attacks launched by adversaries.
However, centralized approaches usually suffer from a
single point of trust, which motivates the research of de-
centralized solutions that do not need the anonymization
server. As the representative solution, Chow et al. [13]
proposed a peer-to-peer (P2P) spatial cloaking algorithm
that leverages single-hop communication and/or multihop
routing among peers to generate cloaked region without
help from a centralized anonymization server. The algo-
rithm offers two modes. The candidate searching step is
triggered by queries in the demand mode, whereas it is
periodically executed in the proactive mode. Later, Chow
et al. [14] improved their scheme with information shar-
ing scheme, historical location scheme and cloaked region
adjustment scheme. After that, Che et al. [8] proposed
the dual-active mode that allows peers both actively col-
lect location data and actively disseminate collected data
to others, which offers better performance than the pre-
vious two modes. However, the above P2P approaches
are not reliable when there are malicious peers in the net-
work. To secure the P2P scheme, Jin et al. [23, 24] intro-
duced the pseudonymous authentication technique to pro-
vide message authentication and integrity for peer com-
munication, thus significantly suppressing the impact of
malicious peers.
Recent work has considered the location cloaking prob-
lem under a constrained road network model [40, 30, 10,
43]. Wang and Liu [40] implemented XStar which sup-
ports the k-Anonymity and the road segment diversity in
a road network. Li and Palanisamy [30] further made the
k-anonymity reversible. However, all of these algorithms
guarantee k-Anonymity but they are vulnerable to the pro-
posed location injection attacks as shown in Section 2.3.
The fake users/accounts/identities have become a well-
known security and privacy issue [38]. This problem can
also pose a threat to data aggregation systems, voting sys-
tems, peer-to-peer systems, social networks and misbehav-
ior detection mechanisms. For example, in the peer-to-
peer systems, such a problem can lead to the Sybil attacks
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where an attacker forges multiple identities to compromise
the network to arbitrarily subvert content storage and ac-
quisition [38]. In social networks, an attacker can create
fake accounts to impersonate victims, deceive the victim’s
friends and destroy the victims’ reputations [26]. In the
literature, the defense approaches against these attacks are
usually based on trust among users, position verification,
game theory and access control mechanisms. For instance,
Yu et al. proposed a Sysbil defense approach based on the
trust in the social networks [44]. Chen et al. [9] proposed a
generalized attack-detection model using the spatial corre-
lation of RSS inherited from wireless nodes to detect Sybil
nodes. In this paper, we identify that fake users can also
be utilized in the cloaking-based privacy preserving mech-
anisms to compromise the guarantee k-Anonymity via the
proposed location injection attacks. We then design the
k-Trustee cloaking-based mechanisms to mitigate such at-
tacks. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed ap-
proach is the first work to address this kind of attacks in
the cloaking-based privacy preserving mechanisms.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we identified the vulnerability of the ex-
isting cloaking-based location privacy preserving mecha-
nisms and showed the location injection attacks against
them. We proposed various attack models and demon-
strated the effectiveness of these attacks through simula-
tions. We then proposed the cloaking-based mechanisms
that guarantee the notion of k-Trustee by employing dif-
ferent trust functions and expansion schemes to mitigate
the location injection attacks. Through simulations, we
demonstrated that the k-Trustee cloaking-based privacy
preserving mechanisms are effective against these attacks.
As future work, we plan to study how to achieve k-Trustee
in a peer-to-peer (P2P) environment that has no central-
ized anonymization server. Since P2P spatial cloaking al-
gorithms usually leverage P2P communication to build the
cloaked region, the generation of fake users become harder.
However, similar attacks can still be launched by mali-
cious users. For example, a fixed-location attack can be
launched by malicious users that stay in a particular lo-
cation, e.g., a hospital. Such an adversary can communi-
cate with nearby peers to form cloaked regions and learn
about the peers who are visiting the hospital. Because
of the lack of a global view, computing global trustees in
the P2P environment becomes a challenging problem. A
promising solution to the lack of a global view is to lever-
age the blockchain [35] technique to build global trust. We
believe it can be adopted as a digital ledger to record the
e-stalker and f-stationary to offer a trusted global view in
the P2P environment. A blockchain insures credibility so
that all the users are guaranteed that they all see the same
e-stalker and f-stationary when they participate in the lo-
cation anonymization process. These values, once being
submitted to the blockchain, become nearly tamper-proof
unless someone controls a majority of computation power
of the distributed network [1]. One potential way to imple-
ment this process is to develop a decentralized application
over the Ethereum smart contract platform [41], which
can collect e-stalker and f-stationary from mobile users,
compute the global e-stalker and f-stationary values and
show these global values to all the mobile users through
Ethereum mobile browsers (e.g., Toshi [2]). Another future
direction is to enable our system to distinguish intentional
stalking behavior from unintentional stalking. A group of
people who travel together within a period of time may
label each other as e-stalkers. As a result, each of them
may be globally labeled as e-stalker by many, and thus,
it becomes hard to add them into a cloaked region that
require members with lower count of being an e-stalker.
A potential solution requires each user to maintain a list
of trusted user IDs, such as a friend list or family group
in many kinds of applications. Then, after receiving the
cloaked regions from AS, this list can be used as a fil-
ter so that the e-stalker values are only computed for the
unknown users. Here, it is important that the metadata
used should not create additional privacy risks. In order
to control and mitigate such potential risks, one approach
is to avoid the creation of new metadata each time for the
location anonymization process and instead we can lever-
age existing user relationship information such as a friend
list on social networks as the source of metadata. Such an
approach significantly reduces the amount of newly gener-
ated metadata and mitigates any potential risks associated
with the use of metadata.
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